

Control of Corruption in a Relationship with Public Budget and Social-Economic Indexes, In The Case Of Vietnam

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Abstract: -Corruption which not only is a global phenomenon but also has been existing for a long time are receiving much concerned of many scholars and practitioners of public administration discipline worldwide, and Vietnam is not an exception. Corruption is generally linked with essence activities of the public authorities and especially with the monopolistic discretionary power of the state. According to The Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index - PAPI reports, the score of the Control of Corruption varied from 4,31 to 7,14 among 63 provinces in Vietnam in 2016. This article assessed the state-of-the-field by addressing the following question: Why did the control of corruption vary among provinces? To be more precise, this paper aims to find the reasons which make the control of corruption index varied among 63 provinces in Vietnam, primarily concentrates on the interaction between corruption and public budget; between corruption and some socio-economic characteristics. The exciting result is there is no relationship between the control of corruption and public budget. Only Gross Regional Domestic Product – GRDP has a positive effect on the control corruption while poverty rate, Average Income, Ethnic Minority, and unemployment rate have a negative impact.

Keywords: -Control of corruption, corruption, public budget, social-economic index, provincial level, Vietnam

Introduction

Plato showed in his famous work “The Republic” which was written before Christ about Socrates dialogues. Socrates points out the human tendency to be corrupted by power, and he concludes that ruling should be left to philosophers, who are the most just and therefore least susceptible to corruption. Corruption has been existing for a long time, and it is a global phenomenon. It is not the exclusive preserve of any nation, race or section of the world but transcends national boundaries and frontiers and symbolizes phenomenal universal unwholesomeness politically (Aluko, 2009).

Mauro defined corruption as the misuse of public office for private gain (Mauro, 1995). It is one of the major causes of public distrust in governments (Eigen, 2002). Increasing worldwide concerns about reducing corruption in the public sector give considerable impetus to the search for the causes and consequences of corruption.

Corruption is generally linked with essence activities of the public authorities and especially with the monopolistic discretionary power of the state. There are much research shows the effect of corruption on public spending or economic growth around the world (Imam and Jacobs, 2014; Nguyen et.al. 2016, Yu et.al. 2008; Liu and Mikesell, 2014, 2017, Cordis, 2014 ...). How about the opposite? Which factors impact on corruption and make it different from place to place, from time to time?

Vietnam's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of Transparency International remained relatively stable overall from 2012 – 2016 (from 31 – 33) and Vietnam fell to 113th (a big number is bad; a low number is good) place out of 176 countries and territories which was surveyed. The fight against corruption had received increasing public attention in Vietnam, especially after 2005, when a new law on corruption was passed.

In Vietnam, the subject of anti-corruption or anti-bribery is mainly governed by the Anti-Corruption Law and the Penal Code.

The Anti-Corruption Law had been published for the first time in 2005, No. 55/2005/QH11, which was passed by the National Assembly on 29 November 2005, took effect on June 1st, 2006 and amended in 2007 and 2012. The Anti-Corruption Law is considered as a "code of conduct" for persons who hold positions of responsibility and power, including state officials, public employees and other persons entrusted with state power ("Officials"). The Anti-Corruption Law forms the basis for the application of the Penal Code concerning bribery offenses. It does not address the act of giving bribes nor does it provide specific sanctions for non-compliance. For non-compliant acts, the Anti-Corruption Law refers to the Penal Code (Penal Code No. 15/1999/QH10, which was passed by the National Assembly on 21 December 1999, came into effect on 1 July 2000 and amended in 2009), the Law on Cadres and State Officials (Law No. 22/2008/QH12 on Cadres and Civil Servants, which was passed by the National Assembly on 13 November 2008 and came into effect on 1 January 2010) and the Law on Public Employees (Law No. 58/2010/QH12 on Public Employees, which was passed by the National Assembly on 29 November 2010 and came into effect on 1 January 2012) for sanctions, depending on the seriousness of the violation. Concerning bribery (private to public), the Penal Code addresses both the persons holding "public" positions of responsibility and power; and those giving bribes or acting as intermediaries for bribery. The Penal Code sets out elements of corruption-related crimes and relevant criminal liabilities and punishments. As of 1 July 2016, specific provisions of the new 2015 Penal Code (including certain bribery-related clauses) came into effect, according to Letter No. 276/TANDTC-PC of the Supreme Court (Penal Code No. 100/2015/QH13, which was passed by the National Assembly on 27 November 2015 and partially came into effect on 1 July 2016 according to Letter No. 276/TANDTC-PC of the Supreme Court dated 13 September 2016). However, those provisions of the 2015 Penal Code, which extend

their application to private sector bribery and bribery of foreign public officials and officials of public international organizations, have not yet taken effect. To sum up, these laws played a significant and important role in improving anticorruption measures, but has not significantly reduced the occurrence of corruption. (Jairo, 2013).

In a report to National Assembly about the Anti-corruption in Vietnam in 2017, Mr. Le Minh Khai - General Inspector of Government said: In 2017, 39 heads were disciplined due to irresponsibility for corrupt behavior, an increase of 28 persons compared to 2016. 6,845 administrative inspections, with a recovery of 46.268 trillion dong, 5.008 hectares of land; proposed administrative handling of over 2,057 collectives and individuals (Bang, 2017). Besides, through inspection and settlement of complaints and accusations, the inspection branch has detected 136 cases, increased 177% than in 2016.

At provincial level, according to The Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index - PAPI reports which is the most extensive time-series national governance and public administration performance monitoring tool in Viet Nam exclusively based on citizens experiences, the score of the Control of Corruption varied from 4,31 to 7,14 among 63 provinces in Vietnam in 2016 (CECODES, VFF-CRT & UNDP, 2017). The "Control of Corruption" dimension is comprised of four sub-dimensions: (i) limits on public sector corruption, (ii) limits on corruption in public service delivery, (iii) equity in state employment, and (iv) willingness to fight corruption. It measures the performance of institutions and local governments in controlling corruption in the public sector. It also shows the tolerance of corrupt practices and the willingness to curb corruption by both local governments and citizens. The analysis in this section indicates that the public sector needs concerted efforts to address systemically embedded corrupt practices. This report illustrated central and southern provinces tend to do better in anti-corruption efforts than northern areas. Among the top 16 best performers, eight are Mekong Delta provinces, and five are from the central region. In

2016, Can Tho, Tien Giang, and Ben Tre were the best performers in this dimension. Long An remained in the best performing group for six years in a row. At the other end of the spectrum, Ha Noi has stayed in the most miserable performing group for six years. Two other centrally governed municipalities, Ho Chi Minh City and Hai Phong, joined the poor performing group along with other five northern and three Central Highlands provinces in 2016. Binh Duong dropped to the weakest level, with a mean dimensional score of 4.31 points, significantly lower than the highest dimensional score of 7.14 points for Can Tho (CECODES, VFF-CRT & UNDP, 2017).

Why did this index differ among provinces? This paper aims to find the reasons which make the control of corruption index varied among 63 provinces in Vietnam, mainly concentrates on the interaction between corruption and public budget; between corruption and some socio-economic characteristics.

Literature Review and Hypothesis

Corruption and Public Budget

Much theoretical and empirical research shows the relation between corruption and public budget. Corruption increases total state expenditure (Liu and Mikesell, 2014; Moschovis, 2010), the sharing of governmental spending on health and hospitals, housing and community development and natural resources (Cordis, 2014) and the state and local government debt levels (Liu, Moldogaziev and Mikesell, 2017) while decreasing the share of government expenditures on education, corrections and public welfare (Cordis, 2014). It also has a statistically significant impact on tax revenues (Imam and Jacobs, 2014; Crandall, and Bodin, 2005; Yu et.al., 2008; Barreto and Alm, 2003).

On the other side, both Elliot (1997) and Churchill et.al. (2013) illustrated that public budget is one of the factors affecting corruption. They suggested that the control of corruption decreases with the high level of the national budget divided by the national gross domestic product GDP. In a report of the International Monetary Fund, Tanzi (1998) also noted that some characteristics which belong to

public budget such as taxation, spending decisions financing of parties promote corruption directly. It is so bright that there is a healthy relationship between control corruption and public budget.

In case of Vietnam, we are interested in some ratios which involved in public budget. In this paper, with a different perspective about the public budget, we evaluate the affecting on the control of corruption of the ratios between Total Revenues and total population, Grants and total revenue, Total Expenditure and population, total expenditure and Gross Regional Domestic Product at provincial levels.

Corruption and Socio-economic characteristics

A lot of previous literature on the growth of economic sheds the harmful impact of corruption on economic growth. (Montinola and Jackman, 2002; Hall and Jones, 1999; Park, 2001; Dreher and Herzfeld, 2005; Bird, 2008; Monte and Papagni, 2001, Mauro, 1995; Nguyen et. al., 2016). Montinola and Jackman showed that the lower incidence of corruption, the higher levels of economic development while Mauro said that Corruption has the negative impact both the growth and the level of national gross domestic product (GDP). Some scholars investigated that corruption exacerbates income inequality and poverty (Gupta, S. et.al., 2002; Mauro, 1995; Jain, 2001).

In vice versa, economics influences corruption that was mentioned by Montinola and Jackman. They argued that the higher level of economic development, the lower incidence of corruption (Montinola and Jackman, 2002). However, there is a lack of research which mentions the effect of the social index on corruption. A question therefore remains whether Socio-economic indexes determines corruption. This paper examines the relationship between some social, economic index such as GRDP, poverty rate, unemployment rate, ethnic minority rate and average income on provinces' control of corruption score.

Hypothesis

While these recent studies have considerably advanced our understanding of the impact of corruption at the states level, much undoubtedly

remain to be done. This article draws on its predecessors to offer a fresh analysis of the factors which impact on the corruption at the provincial level. In general team, I pursue a theme of various ratios in public budget and socioeconomic indexes

that emphasizes why the control of corruption scores varied among provinces. I address this theme in the context of the following two distinct empirical hypotheses.

Table 1: Expected Direction of the Relationship with the Control of Corruption

No.	Independent variable	Category	Expected sign
1	Ratios between Total Revenues and total population	Public Budget	+
2	Ratios between Grants and total revenue	Public Budget	+
3	Ratios between Total Expenditure and population	Public Budget	-
4	Ratios between total expenditure and Gross Regional Domestic Product	Public Budget	-
5	Gross Regional Domestic Product - GRDP	Socio-economic indexes	+
6	Poverty	Socio-economic indexes	-
7	Average Income	Socio-economic indexes	+
8	Ethnic Majority	Socio-economic indexes	-
9	Unemployment	Socio-economic indexes	-

Research Design

Variable and Data Sources

The dependent variable of this paper is the control of corruption. This study uses data on the control of corruption from Centre for Community Support and Development Studies (CECODES), Centre for Research and Training of the Viet Nam Fatherland Front (VFF-CRT) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) publication The Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index Report (PAPI). The index is based on the sixth consecutive annual nationwide survey, which in 2016 captured the views and experiences of 14,063 randomly selected citizens. The control of corruption is one of six dimensions of PAPI. Since the first pilot survey in 2009, 88,962 citizens across Viet Nam have engaged in face-to-face interviews across all 63 provinces and municipalities in Viet Nam and shared their

experiences and assessments of governance and public administration performance by the State apparatus from the central to commune levels. This report has three broad aims. First, it provides a set of baseline indicators for the Government of Viet Nam that can be used to track its performance during the 2016-2021 term. Second, the findings can help to gauge the effectiveness of ongoing institutional and policy reforms to achieve the new government’s goal “to build a government that facilitates development, acts with integrity and pro-activeness, and works for its People.” Third, it identifies areas for action as the government attempts to achieve the national agenda for sustainable development (CECODES, VFF-CRT & UNDP, 2017). We collected the control of corruption scores in 2016.

The data of independent variables in this paper is collected from Statistical Yearbook of each province in 2015 which is published by the Statistical Office

Windy – Thi Ngoc Minh Phan / Control of Corruption in a Relationship with Public Budget and Social-Economic Indexes, In The Case Of Vietnam

of each province and from the General Statistics Office of Vietnam in 2015.

We analyze 63 provinces in Vietnam that divide six regions by geographical location. Table 2 will show the description of variables of sources of data.

Table 2: Description of Variables of Sources of Data

No.	Variables	Description
1	C: Control of Corruption	Index, indicating the control in each province, ranging from 1 (for most corruption) to 10 (for the cleanest). Source: PAPI Index, CECODES, VFF-CRT & UNDP, 2017
2.	R1: the ratio between Total Revenues and total Population R2: the ratio between Grants and total revenue	Raito which is calculated by the author form statistical yearbook 2015 of each province which showed the structure of the state budget revenue and expenditure in a local area.
	E1: the ratio between Total Expenditure and population E2: the ratio between total expenditure and Gross Regional Domestic Product	
3	GRDP: Gross regional domestic Product	A general indicator is reflecting the final results of production and business activities of the whole economy in a given period. GRDP is calculated at current and constant prices. Source: Statistical Yearbook of each province
4	P: Poverty	Poverty rate (%). Five dimensions of poverty (10 measurement indicators): education (adult and child education), health (health insurance and access to medical service), housing (the quality of housing and average housing area per capital); living stand (clean water sanitation facilities) and information access (use of telecommunication service and asserts to serve information access) The household is classified as poverty if they have a monthly average income per capital under the minimum living standard line or they are deprived on at least 3 of total ten

		indicators and have a monthly average income per capital under the average living standard line, upper minimum standard line. Source: General Statistics Office of Vietnam
5	I: average income	Monthly average income per capita Source: Statistical Yearbook of each province
6	M: ethnic majorities	A ratio between ethnic majorities and total population Source: General Statistics Office of Vietnam
7	U: unemployment	Unemployment rate Source: General Statistics Office of Vietnam

Methods and Model Specification

Descriptive Statistics and regression are two methods which are used in this article. Regression is an appropriate model for understanding the relationship between dependent variable C: control of corruption and 9 independent variables which are R1: ratio between Total Revenues and total

Population; R2: ratio between Grants and total revenue; E1: ratio between Total Expenditure and

Population; E2: ratio between total expenditure and Gross Regional Domestic Product; GRDP: Gross regional domestic Product; P: Poverty; I: average income; M: ethnic majorities and U: Unemployment.

First, the independent variables which were related to a public budget are taken part in the regression

Table 3: The basic statistic

<i>Variables</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Minimum</i>	<i>Maximum</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Median</i>	<i>Standard Deviation</i>
C: Control of Corruption	63	4,31	7,14	5,8962	5,80	0,55953
R1: Total revenue/Population	63	1.990,58	82.237,42	10.971,028	10.971,0286	12.633,98574
R2 Grants/ Total Revenue	63	0,00	2,94	0,1327	0,1327	0,40235

progress. The basic specification for the model is as follows:

$$C = \beta_0 + \beta_1 R_1 + \beta_2 R_2 + \beta_3 E_1 + \beta_4 E_2$$

Next, the social, economic indexes are joined the regression procedure. The basic equation for the model is as follows.

$$C = \beta_0 + \beta_1 GRDP + \beta_2 P + \beta_3 I + \beta_4 M + \beta_5 U$$

The two above regressions use 63 provinces dummies; this enables us to understand the impact of a provincial specific factor on the control of corruption of each province. Each province has specific circumstances that cannot be explained by nine independent variables.

Empirical Findings

Descriptive analysis

E1	Total						
Expenditure/	63	5.579,62	25.600,53	12.670,173	12670,1727	4750,99178	
Population							
E2	Total						
expenditure/GRD	63	5,72	181,39	48,2432	48,2432	33,92849	
P							
GRDP	63	5.475,90	720.178,00	62.876,537	62.876,5365	107.818,9752	
I: Average Income	63	1.222.000	5.481.000	2.712.000	2.593.000	971.019,2184	
M:	Ethnic						
Minority	45	0,21	92,69	22,0687	12,2287	26,44645	
P: Poverty	63	0,00	31,50	9,3556	8,0000	7,19493	
U: Unemployment	63	0,42	4,61	2,2083	2,2500	1,06503	

Sixty-three provinces were analyzed in 10 different variables. Based on table 3, there is a big classification between almost variables. One half or more provinces have a lower index of the control of corruption from 5,8. There is a big classification between the score of the control of corruption between 4,31 (a very corruptive province) and 7,14 (very transparent province).

There is also a significant classification between the GRDP, between 5.475 billion VND and 720.178 billion VND. Lower or same GRDP from 62.876 have half or more provinces.

There a big difference between the lowest average income (1.222 million VND a month) and the highest (5.481 million VND a month). In half or more provinces, there is a lower income, or it remains the same 2.593 million VND a month. Same with the rest.

Regression

The results of regression progress related to public budget as below:

Table 4: First regression result

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
	B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
(Constant)	6,166	0,204		30,261	0,000		
1 R1	-1,327E-005	0,000	-0,300	-1,713	0,092	0,492	2,032
R2	-0,191	0,174	-0,137	-1,099	0,276	0,961	1,041
E1	-5,360E-006	0,000	-0,046	-0,196	0,845	0,280	3,575
E2	-0,001	0,004	-0,038	-0,170	0,865	0,296	3,378

Sig. value of R1 (Total Revenue/ Population), R2 (Grants/Total Revenue), E1 (Total Expenditure/ Total population) and E2 (Total Expenditure/GRDP) is over 0,05. This fact means these independent variables have not significant in this model which is

so interesting because it is not in line with my hypothesis and the existing literature that there surely is a relationship between the control of corruption and public budget ratios.

Table 5: Second Regression Result

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
	B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
(Constant)	7,597	0,629		12,080	0,000		
GRDP	9,397E-008	0,000	0,022	0,102	0,919	0,347	2,879
I	-4,330E-007	0,000	-0,775	-2,484	0,017	0,161	6,212
1 M	-0,012	0,005	-0,589	-2,426	0,020	0,266	3,757
P	-0,016	0,026	-0,199	-0,597	0,554	0,141	7,111
U	-0,082	0,083	-0,161	-0,985	0,330	0,589	1,699

From table 5, two independent variables which are statistically significant which confidence level at 5% are Average Income (I) and Ethnic Minority (M). The adjusted R2 of this model is 32,7%. The hypothesis which mentioned GRDP, Ethnic Minority, Poverty, unemployment is accepted. Only GRDP has a positive relationship with the control of corruption although this effect is so small. As expected in the hypothesis, the level of control of corruption is likely to be higher with the lower rate of poverty. Moreover, both Ethnic Minority and Unemployment have a negative impact on the control of corruption. However, one variable - Average Income has an adverse effect on the control of corruption, that is not in line my hypothesis.

Discussion

The most surprising from the consequence is that the ratios in public budget likely do not affect the control of corruption. This is not in line with the existing literature. The question “Why?” therefore is risen? Maybe the reason is centralized finance. In Vietnam, all province after reporting the public budget to the government, the provincial governments which are inadequate (poor provinces) will receive the financial supporting from the central government and vice versa they must send the

money to the central government if they are supernumerary (prosperous provinces, cities). Moreover, the bias may arise from the score of the control of corruption which is based on the perceptions of citizens in very different provinces while the public budget is given by the local government. Perhaps, this result implied that the public budget ratios we used to measure do not necessarily capture the control of corruption. In order to have deeply understood the relationship between corruption and public budget at a provincial level in Vietnam, we need to do more research in the future.

The ethnic minority which has a negative impact on the control of corruption that means the higher ethnic minority, the higher corruption. It is regrettable that the ethnic minority is given, and no local government can do to change the number of an ethnic minority. The best way is to focus on the other factors. In a multi-ethnic province, people can place the interest of the people from the same ethnic group above the interests of that place. When they are in power, they can abuse public authority for the personal gain of their attention. They can direct access to natural resources for people of the same race; Use the recruitment process for the benefit of ethnic groups and award contracts to colleagues.

Average income is also a determinant of social-economic characteristics of the control of corruption, the higher average income, the more senior corruption.

Corruption remains a serious problem in Vietnam. It is recognized that the “breakthrough” on reducing corruption will come not through “peace meal” changes in legislation, but rather through enforcement mechanisms that will challenge corrupt practices and rent-seeking behaviors among public officials and civil servants that use public office as a vehicle for personal enrichment

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