Ideological and Organizational Crisis of Nepali Communist Parties in the Context of the Post-2025 Gen Z Movement: A Critical Study

1. Introduction

In the political history of Nepal, the communist movement has been established as a powerful ideological and organizational force. Since the establishment of the Communist Party of Nepal in 1949 (B.S. 2006), it has played a significant role in leading struggles against feudalism and imperialism, contributing to the radical transformation of Nepali society [65]. From the very beginning, it has consistently mobilized peasants, workers, the proletariat, and the petty bourgeoisie through slogans centered on class struggle, social justice, and equality (Nepal Communist Party, 1949). However, with the passage of time, and especially after the 2025 Gen-Z movement, Nepal’s communist movement appears to have entered one of the most serious ideological and organizational crises in its history. This is evidenced by the recent election results, which reflect the declining public support and achievements of communist forces (Election Commission Nepal, 2026). This crisis is not limited to electoral defeat or loss of power; rather, it represents a profound disconnection in the fundamental theoretical foundation, class identity, and relationship with the new generation. The tension between traditionally Marxist-Leninist-oriented communist parties and the technologically empowered Gen-Z generation has introduced a new dimension to Nepali politics. It is evident that Nepalese communists have failed to adequately understand that the tendency to exaggerate digital influence can be challenged and that an empirical realist perspective can be presented [52].

In 2025, the unprecedented Gen-Z movement in Nepal emerged not at the call of any established political party, but as an expression of anger organized by youth through digital spaces. This uprising completely overturned Nepal’s power equation, toppling the then powerful government led by CPN (UML) and the Nepali Congress, and even creating a situation that led to the dissolution of the House of Representatives (Office of the President of Nepal, 2026). In this period of crisis, the formation of an interim government under the leadership of former Chief Justice Sushila Karki, along with the results of the election held on 2026 (Falgun 21, B.S. 2082), sounded an alarm bell for the communists. According to the final results of the House of Representatives election, significant changes were observed in the vote shares of different political parties (Election Commission Nepal, 2026).

Not only did major parties such as CPN (UML) and other communist forces—despite repeatedly being in government—suffer defeats, but even in districts like Pyuthan and Baglung, long considered strongholds of the Mashal group, candidates faced humiliating losses, including forfeiture of deposits. Similarly, the defeat of Nepal Majdur Kisan Prty (Nepal Workers and Peasants Party) in Bhaktapur Constituency No. 1 clearly revealed a shift in voter psychology and priorities (Election Commission Nepal, 2026). The root of this crisis lies in ideological deviation and the problem of class collaboration. While the dialectical materialist perspective advanced by Marx and Engels explains social development on the basis of class struggle, Nepalese communists appear to have gradually deviated from this path and shifted toward class collaboration. Programs such as the CPN (UML)’s People’s Multiparty Democracy (Pushpalal Memorial Foundation, 2017, pp. 115–160) and the Maoists' 21st Century People’s Democracy (Nepal Communist Party [Maoist], 2006, p. 242) have, in effect, accepted parliamentary democracy as the ultimate goal, thereby blunting their revolutionary edge. In the struggle for power and state control, parties have lost their moral and intellectual leadership (hegemony). Entrapment in corruption, nepotism, and patronage networks has eroded the ideological credibility of communist forces, and those who were once revolutionaries have increasingly become carriers of the status quo. Political parties have established disproportionate control over state institutions, weakening mechanisms of accountability and limiting transparency in governance [51]. Communist groups have also exhibited similar weaknesses.

The current era of information technology has fundamentally transformed the process of ideology formation. Ideology is no longer shaped primarily by the party class but increasingly through the digital screen, where the mere exposure effect and algorithms influence the psychology of youth [2]. Short-form videos and continuous scrolling have reduced young people’s attention span, leaving them with little patience to engage with substantial works such as Marx’s Capital. This cognitive shift has rendered the traditional propaganda methods of communist parties largely ineffective. Digital media has promoted capitalist consumerism in such a way that it has transformed genuine class consciousness into false consciousness [43].

Organizationally, Nepali communist parties are also trapped in bureaucratic and rigid structures under the name of democratic centralism. After the 2025 movement demonstrated the effectiveness of decentralized and network-based organizations, youth are no longer willing to become loyal servants of any party. Even groups like CPN (Mashal) have admitted their inability to attract the new generation, highlighting the depth of the crisis (Nepal Communist Party [Mashal], 2024). Due to entrenched old leadership and unequal distribution of opportunities within parties, communism has come to be perceived by the new generation as an outdated museum artifact. In other words, Nepalese communists fail to understand the generation gap and how the perspectives of the new generation differ. They have also failed to pay attention to how the old leadership continues to control access to opportunities ([36]; [6]).

The present study primarily addresses the gap between class-based politics and actual political behavior observed after the incorporation of communism into parliamentary democracy. On one hand, there is the claim of representing the proletariat, and on the other, ideological and organizational deviations arising from compromises with capitalist intermediaries, which constitute the main challenge. This study aims to analyze the ideological and organizational crisis following the 2025 movement, the influence of digital media, and the impact of class-collaboration policies. Using qualitative methods and a historical dialectical materialist approach, this research seeks to illuminate the existential crisis currently facing Nepal’s communist movement and the necessity for its potential transformation.

2. Literature Review

[61], in Marxism and the Class Struggle, extends the concept of class struggle beyond the economic sphere to political and ideological dimensions, emphasizing its revolutionary significance. It highlights class consciousness, the role of the party, and the inevitability of revolution. The relevance of this study lies in providing a theoretical foundation for understanding class struggle as a multidimensional and dynamic process. However, its limitation is that it does not analyze reformist tendencies and the shift toward class coordination in developing countries like Nepal. Marx and Engels (1976), in The German Ideology, argue that all history is the history of class struggle, providing the foundational basis for Marxist analysis. This work is crucial for understanding structural inequality and historical transformation. However, it does not address contemporary digital transformations and their influence on class consciousness. [40], in Class and Class Consciousness in Marxist Theory, analyzes the formation of class consciousness and its relationship with social structures. It provides insight into the psycho-social basis of ideology. However, it is primarily focused on Western contexts.

Orben and Przybylski (2019) examine the relationship between digital media use and youth well-being, finding only minimal effects. This challenges exaggerated claims about digital media influence. However, it lacks deeper theoretical explanation, particularly regarding repeated exposure and stabilization. [17], in Capitalism and Class Struggle in the USSR, argues that capitalist tendencies can re-emerge within socialist systems, leading to the continuation of class struggle in new forms. It highlights the rise of a bureaucratic class and changing power relations. Its relevance lies in explaining the transformation of class struggle, but it is limited in its applicability to Nepal’s multi-layered social structure. [25] studies habituation in social networks, showing that repeated exposure reduces user response. This supports the idea that media effects stabilize over time, but it does not address ideological implications.

Chiossi et al. (2023) analyze the effects of short-form videos on memory and attention, finding negative cognitive impacts. While it shows the influence of media format, it does not explore long-term political or ideological consequences. While [5] provides important insights into participatory governance and institutional limitations in Nepal, the study does not specifically examine youth political participation, the processes of political mobilization, or the role of ideological and discursive factors. Furthermore, it lacks engagement with critical theoretical frameworks such as post-Marxism and does not address the influence of digital media in shaping contemporary political engagement. Therefore, there remains a significant gap in understanding how institutional weaknesses interact with youth agency, discourse, and class dynamics in the context of Nepal.

Arora et al. (2024) demonstrate how algorithmic social media shapes behavior and thinking through repeated exposure. This is highly relevant for understanding digital ideology formation but lacks analysis of stabilization processes. Nivins et al. (2024) show that long-term digital media use affects brain development and cognitive control. It provides a biological basis for understanding thought formation but does not address ideology.

Naik et al. (2025) provide a systematic review of digital media’s impact on cognition, including attention and memory. It helps explain cognitive restructuring but lacks focus on belief stabilization. (Mayen et al. (2025) show that digital media effects on academic performance are complex and non-linear. This highlights the complexity of media influence but does not explain ideological formation. Baumgartner(2025), On the Stabilization of Media Effects after Repeated Exposure explains that media effects stabilize through habituation, adaptation, and learning. This provides a key theoretical base but lacks empirical testing in developing countries.

Coyne et al. (2026) show that digital media effects on mental health are dynamic over time. This helps explain changing media impacts but lacks clarity on stabilization phases. Rahi and Arohia (2026) examine the psychological effects of social media, including anxiety and social comparison. While useful for understanding mental structures, it does not address ideological formation. Niranjan [51], in The New Political Generation: Gen-Z and the Transformation of Political Paradigms in Nepal (Unpublished) explains how geopolitical influence, governance crisis, socio-economic frustration, and reform-oriented consciousness shape Generation-Z political awareness. It is highly relevant for understanding youth political behavior in Nepal but lacks Marxist analysis and class-based perspectives.

A comprehensive analysis of the above studies reveals two major intellectual strands. The first is grounded in the Marxist perspective, focusing on class struggle, class consciousness, and the structural and ideological analysis of power relations. The second consists of empirical studies examining the effects of digital media on individuals’ psychological, cognitive, and behavioral structures. While the first strand explains the material basis of society, class divisions, and the dialectical process of historical change, the second demonstrates how thought, perception, and behavior are being reconstructed in the digital era. However, the interconnection between these two strands—particularly how the algorithmic structure of digital media, repeated exposure, and habituation processes transform ideological formation, class consciousness, and political orientation—remains underexplored. Specifically, in a developing and multi-layered society like Nepal, there is a lack of comprehensive studies that examine the relationship between digital influence, ideological stabilization, and class struggle, and how this has contributed to the ideological and organizational crisis within the communist movement. In this context, the present research aims to analyze the dialectical relationship between new forms of class struggle, ideological deviation, and emerging political consciousness in the digital age, thereby addressing a significant research gap in the existing literature.

3. Method and Methodology

The present study will employ a qualitative research method to analyze the latest challenges developed within Nepal’s communist movement and the impact of the digital era.

Research Design: This research is based on a critical and analytical framework. In particular, it adopts a historical dialectical materialist approach to examine the historical development of Nepalese communist parties and conduct a comparative study of the changing political landscape following the 2025 Gen-Z movement. Additionally, under descriptive and exploratory categories, the study will investigate the impact of digital media on the cognitive and ideological structures of youth and explore how this has generated crises within party organizations.

Data Collection: This study utilizes secondary sources, including party documents from Mashal, CPN (UML), and Maoist parties from different periods. Additionally, relevant international journals, an unpublished article by Niranjan [51], and other pertinent books were also used.

Data Analysis: The collected data will be analyzed through content analysis, examining the words and narratives used in political speeches, captions, and party documents. Under thematic analysis, the interpretation will focus on major themes such as ideological deviation, organizational rigidity, digital influence, and class collaboration. Using triangulation, conclusions will be drawn by aligning theory (Marxism), empirical data, and current political events.

Theoretical Framework: The study is grounded on three main theoretical pillars:

1. Marxist Theory of Class Struggle – to understand the material basis of society and the inevitability of class struggle.

2. Gramscian Hegemony – to analyze how communists are losing their moral and intellectual leadership (hegemony).

3. Digital Media & Mere Exposure Effect – to understand how algorithms and repeated exposure to information stabilize perceptions among youth and displace older ideological frameworks.

Ethical Considerations: The data will be presented objectively, without any bias. Proper citations will be used to prevent plagiarism. This study is free from any financial investment, profit, or conditional influence.

Reflexivity and Limitations: This study primarily focuses on the short-term impact of the 2025 “Gen-Z” movement. When examining various communist factions in Nepal collectively, some specific differences may be overlooked. Moreover, the study relies primarily on secondary sources.

4. Findings and Discussion

4.1 Nepalese Communists Toward a Deep Crisis

Nepalese Communists Limited to Slogans: Although the Communist Party of Nepal’s manifesto promised the complete eradication of feudal autocracy and foreign domination, the establishment of full and genuine independence, the liberation of workers, peasants, and oppressed classes from servitude, the elimination of feudal exploitation, and the nationalization of large industries, insurance companies, and foreign capital, these promises have largely remained unfulfilled despite numerous political movements and the establishment of new political systems (Nepal Communist Party, 1949). Various communist groups have participated in government, yet they have often acknowledged in their own documents that foreign powers, expansionist interests, and imperialist actors continued to pursue their agendas, affecting Nepal’s sovereignty. Even when operating as single-party or coalition governments, issues such as unemployment, inequality, and the outmigration of labor remained unresolved, gradually increasing public disillusionment with the communists. In particular, the new generationperceives the communist promises of liberation and equality as mere rhetoric, turning instead toward leadership that is corruption-free, accountable, and aligned with their own ideological preferences. The inability of Nepalese communist groups to address these fundamental issues has thus intensified their ideological and organizational challenges.

In terms of how central and local governments are run, there appears to be little fundamental difference between the capitalist style of governance and that of Nepalese communists. Parties such as CPN (UML), Maoists, Mashal, and CPN (Unified Marxist–Leninist) have long administered government at both central and local levels based on their respective organizational capacities and popular support. There is a notable lack of clear examples distinguishing communist governance from the power exercised by capitalist democrats. The public cannot be said to remember or celebrate these actions as uniquely communist achievements. However, some exceptions exist, such as the social security allowances and the “Self-Reliant Village Development Program” introduced during CPN (UML)’s minority government, as well as a few reform initiatives by Nepal Majdur kisan party (Nepal Workers and Peasants Party) in Bhaktapur-1. Yet, these were insufficient to attract the attention of the youth. Despite the proud historical role of Nepalese communists in the long struggle for the Constituent Assembly, the Jhapa rebellion, the 1990 People’s Movement (B.S. 2046), the Maoist armed insurgency, and the 2006–2007 People’s Movement (B.S. 2062–63), they failed to advance meaningful reforms during governance. Their inability to implement programs that directly addressed public psychology gradually led to a state of erosion of legitimacy. Within this context, ideological decay among Nepalese communists pushed them away from the field of core communist values, paving the way for the emergence of the Gen-Z movement. This movement clearly created additional crises for Nepalese communists. It is therefore necessary to discuss why this movement became a crisis for the communists in Nepal.

Crisis Arising from the Abandonment of Class Struggle and the Shift toward Class Collaboration: According to Marxist theory, the fundamental premise is that “the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles” [34]. This clearly suggests that social transformation occurs not through class harmony, but through class conflict and struggle. However, many communist parties in Nepal appear to have gradually abandoned the path of class struggle and moved toward class collaboration. The following key aspects are central to understanding this shift.

Centrality of Class Struggle in Marxism: According to Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, class struggle is the driving force of historical development [34]. In capitalist society, an inherent conflict exists between two major classes: the bourgeoisie (owners of the means of production) and the proletariat (working class). Marxism views class struggle not only as an economic conflict but also as a political and ideological one (Lenin, 1917/1964). With the development of class consciousness, the working class is expected to overthrow capitalism through revolution. From this perspective, class collaboration is considered temporary or illusory, as stable cooperation is not possible within exploitative relations [34].

Concept of Class Collaboration:Class collaboration refers to the policy of cooperation, compromise, and coexistence between different classes. This idea is particularly associated with social democratic and revisionist traditions (Bernstein, 1899/1993). It assumes that there is not only conflict but also mutual interdependence between capitalists and workers. However, Marxist critics argue that such an approach stabilizes rather than challenges the structural basis of class exploitation (Lenin, 1917/1964).

Deviation from Class Struggle in the Nepali Context:In the early phase of Nepal’s communist movement (especially after 1949), there was a clear commitment to class struggle, revolution, and socialist transformation. However, in later phases, several trends of deviation have emerged:

Shift toward Parliamentary Politics

Most communist parties in Nepal have abandoned armed struggle or revolutionary strategies and embraced parliamentary democracy. The CPN (UML), particularly after its Fifth Congress, introduced the program of People’s Multiparty Democracy, which effectively abandoned the notion that armed struggle is the highest form of class struggle. Instead, it promoted a peaceful transition to socialism and communism through parliamentary means (Pushpalal Memorial Foundation, 2017, pp. 115–160). This policy appears to have confined the party within the cycle of electoral competition.

Similarly, the former CPN (Maoist Centre), which had initiated armed struggle in 1996 based on class struggle, entered the peace process in 2006 and adopted the framework of 21st Century People’s Democracy (Nepal Communist Party [Maoist], 2006, p. 242) . The Maoist movement, which had proclaimed the establishment of a New Democratic system through armed struggle, ultimately transformed into parliamentary politics [1]. This shift reduced the public support that communists had gained through the slogan of armed struggle and created a sense of distrust toward the very idea of armed struggle.Under this framework, it embraced electoral competition and peaceful political processes, thereby prioritizing class collaboration over revolutionary class struggle.

On the other hand, CPN (Mashal), which had adopted the program of New Democratic Revolution as a strategic goal since its Fourth Congress (1974), continued to emphasize revolutionary rhetoric. However, citing the absence of favorable objective and subjective conditions, it largely pursued legal and peaceful forms of struggle. Although Mashal has not formally adopted parliamentary strategy, its inability to provide an effective alternative revolutionary tactic has resulted in a practical alignment with parliamentary politics. Thus, its approach has neither become a clear model of class collaboration nor an effective strategy of class struggle (CPN Mashal, 2002, pp. 36–80).

Crisis of Practice and Public Trust

These developments clearly reveal a widening gap between ideology and practice among Nepalese communist parties. Parties such as Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist) and Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre) have gained access to state power through parliamentary processes, yet their governance practices have often failed to deliver results in line with public expectations. On the other hand, parties like Communist Party of Nepal (Mashal) have consistently expressed ideological commitment to revolution, but have been unable to demonstrate it in practice, leading to a gradual decline in their organizational strength.

Public disillusionment with communist politics tends to emerge when a deep contradiction appears between ideology and practice, especially when ideals such as equality, a classless society, and social transformation are not implemented in reality. Even after attaining state power, the failure to ensure good governance, transparency, and effective service delivery contributes to the erosion of public trust [28]. Furthermore, the revolutionary legitimacy gained through armed struggle weakens when it is transformed into parliamentary politics, giving rise to the perception that “the revolution has been reduced to mere rhetoric” [1].

In this context, parliamentary-oriented communist parties have failed to ensure good governance, while revolutionary-oriented groups have been unable to advance any concrete stage of revolution. Their continuous engagement in electoral politics has fostered a tendency toward parliamentarism. On one hand, there is a lack of practical reform; on the other, an absence of concrete revolutionary implementation—together creating a dual crisis.

Overall, these conditions have produced a deep contradiction between rhetoric and practice within Nepal’s communist movement. This contradiction has not only eroded public trust but has also intensified growing frustration and disillusionment toward communist forces. Consequently, the inability of parliamentary communists to deliver practical change and of revolutionary groups to demonstrate revolution in practice has led to widespread public disillusionment with communist politics.

Causes of the Shift toward Class Collaboration: Ideological Crisis, International Influence, Power-Centered Politics, Complexity of Class Structure, Accommodation with State Power, Adoption of Neoliberal Economic Policies, Impact on Public Perception, Transformation through State Power and Neoliberalism are major causes.

Ideological CrisisDue to the lack of deep theoretical understanding and practical application of Marxist theory, ideological ambiguity has been increasing within the communist movement. Since ideology is largely guided by leadership, any deviation at the leadership level significantly affects the entire organization. Marxism is not merely a theoretical framework but a revolutionary guide to practice, which must be continuously adapted to changing conditions (Marx & Engels, 1976). When weaknesses emerge in this process, the movement is more likely to drift toward reformism ( Lenin, 1969).

International Influence

Following the Dissolution of the Soviet Union, socialist movements weakened globally. This event led to widespread disillusionment, reassessment, and strategic shifts among communist parties worldwide, the effects of which are clearly visible in Nepal as well (Hobsbawm, 1994).

Power-Centered PoliticsMany communist parties have increasingly prioritized the acquisition and preservation of state power over revolutionary transformation. This shift has weakened the long-term goal of class struggle and encouraged reformist tendencies (Miliband, 1969).

Complexity of Class StructureIn a multi-ethnic, multilingual, and regionally diverse society like Nepal, it is difficult to define class structure purely on economic grounds. Factors such as caste, region, and identity fragment class consciousness, thereby weakening the clarity and effectiveness of class struggle (Wright, 1997).

Accommodation with State Power

After participating in state power, communist parties in Nepal increasingly shifted their focus from class struggle to governance and management. This transition effectively transformed “revolutionary parties” into “reformist parties.” In other words, once they assumed responsibility for operating what they themselves had described as a bourgeois system, instead of transforming its class character, they gradually adapted to it. The ideological deviation observed in parties such as Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist) and Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre) is reflected in the growing “bourgeoisification” of their organizational structures and political practices. This transformation has been widely discussed in the literature on Nepal’s Maoist movement and broader communist politics, particularly in relation to the party’s shift from armed struggle to parliamentary competition and institutional integration ([1]; [26]). Scholars argue that participation in liberal democratic institutions tends to moderate radical agendas and encourages strategic adaptation rather than structural transformation, thereby diluting revolutionary commitments [28].

Adoption of Neoliberal Economic Policies

In Nepal, both UML and Maoist parties have led governments at different times. However, they have been unable to implement a socialist economic policy. Instead, their governments adopted policies of privatization, liberalization, and market-oriented reforms. Rather than challenging the capitalist structure, these policies contributed to its consolidation.

Despite formally adopting the program of People’s Multiparty Democracy, the CPN (UML), even after leading the government multiple times, failed to take meaningful steps toward restructuring the economy in accordance with its stated ideological framework (Pushpalal Memorial Foundation, 2017, pp. 125–132). This raises a critical question: was the program of multiparty democracy merely a mechanism for operating within the existing system, or was it intended to represent a new stage of revolution in Nepal? Even while holding state power repeatedly, the party was unable to provide a clear answer. This ambiguity highlights a significant gap between its theory and practice.

Similarly, the CPN (Maoist Centre), which initially launched an armed struggle with the objective of establishing a socialist economic system, introduced the framework of 21st Century People’s Democracy after entering the peace process (Nepal Communist Party [Maoist], 2006). However, even when in a position to implement its ideological commitments, it failed to formulate and execute an economic policy consistent with communist principles. Instead, it gradually embraced neoliberal economic policies, further widening the gap between its ideological claims and actual practices.

Impact on Public Perception

As a result, a clear contradiction emerged between rhetoric and practice. Among the younger generation, these parties increasingly came to be perceived as inconsistent—presenting one set of ideals while practicing another. This dual character has contributed to a growing sense of distrust, making communist parties appear unreliable to the new generation.

Transformation through State Power and Neoliberalism

When communist parties in Nepal entered state power, they increasingly shifted their focus from revolutionary transformation to governance and administrative management. This transition effectively transformed “revolutionary parties” into reformist actors, as they began operating within the existing state structure rather than fundamentally transforming its class character. In this process, parties such as Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist) and Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre) gradually adapted to the institutional logic of the state ([1]; [26]).

Furthermore, studies show that governments led by these parties adopted policy frameworks consistent with neoliberal economic restructuring—such as privatization, market liberalization, and integration into global capitalism—rather than pursuing radical structural transformation ([28]; [59]). Instead of challenging capitalist relations, these policies often contributed to their consolidation. This divergence between ideological commitments and policy practices has created a widening gap between theory and practice.

Scholars also note that such contradictions have contributed to growing public skepticism, particularly among younger generations, who increasingly perceive communist parties as inconsistent or opportunistic ([21]; [1]). In the contemporary (post-2020s) context, this has been further intensified by digital media transformations and changing political consciousness among youth.

Overall, the current situation suggests that Nepalese communist parties are facing not only a political crisis but also a deep ideological and organizational crisis. The contradiction between revolutionary ideals and practical governance, combined with shifting socio-political dynamics, has created an urgent need for critical rethinking and transformation.

Organizational opportunism: Opportunistic tendencies have become dominant within the party, leading to the rise of organizational opportunism. Opportunists argue that in the changed context of the contemporary world communist movement, Lenin’s ideas require creative development. In this way, they emphasize that just as the dictatorship of the proletariat should be abandoned, the party’s leading role and the principle of democratic centralism within the party should also be renounced (Singh, 1992/1993). This reflects a process through which the organizational structure is being transformed and capitalistized, moving away from core communist values.

Critical Analysis:From a Marxist perspective, the shift toward class collaboration is generally interpreted as a regressive or reformist deviation. It fails to challenge the fundamental structure of class exploitation, weakens class consciousness, and limits revolutionary potential within reformist boundaries. According to Karl Marx, class antagonism in capitalist society ultimately leads to revolution, not cooperation [34]. Therefore, class collaboration is not a long-term solution but merely a temporary adjustment.

However, in the contemporary context, some scholars argue that reformist approaches cannot be entirely dismissed. For example, Eduard Bernstein suggested that socialism could also be achieved through gradual reforms [4]. This perspective further complicates the debate between class struggle and class collaboration.

4.2 Political Impact: Crisis of Legitimacy and Electoral Decline

Crisis of Legitimacy:The ideological deviations, organizational weaknesses, and persistent factionalism within Nepal’s communist parties have had a serious impact on their political legitimacy. Legitimacy refers to the socio-political acceptance by the people that a political force is “fit to govern,” which [64] explained through traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational forms. In the Nepali context, communist parties historically built their legitimacy on slogans of class struggle, equality, and social justice. However, in recent years, power-centered politics, ideological ambiguity, and policy inconsistencies have weakened their revolutionary legitimacy. In particular, corruption, opportunism, and ideological deviations observed during their exercise of state power have led to a decline in public trust. According to Antonio Gramsci, such a condition represents a “crisis of hegemony,” where a political force fails to maintain its moral and intellectual leadership. Therefore, the legitimacy crisis of Nepali communist parties is not only political but also ideological and cultural in nature. According to Rajkumar [55], parties such as the CPN (UML) and CPN (Maoist Centre), as they moved from their initial revolutionary commitment toward practical governance, distanced themselves from a foundational analysis of Nepali society and became increasingly drawn to consumerist and capitalist cultural tendencies in their everyday political practices. This deviation from core ideological principles has weakened their ability to articulate a distinctive social vision and has intensified the ideological and cultural crisis within the movement.

Electoral Decline: Electoral decline is a key indicator of weakening political legitimacy among Nepalese communist parties. Historical research on Nepal’s communist movement shows that, despite once commanding substantial influence in the country’s multiparty democracy, communist parties have faced increasing fragmentation, organizational ambiguity, and loss of cohesive ideological direction, contributing to electoral setbacks and a crisis of representation [56]. In the context of Nepal’s recent politics, this trend is reinforced by the erosion of transformative legitimacy as parties have shifted from radical opposition to governance roles without successfully reconciling internal contradictions, leading to growing public disillusionment with traditional communist leadership and increased electoral competition from alternative political forces ([56]; [9]). Such structural and ideological challenges suggest that the decline in electoral support reflects not only political competition but also deeper crises within party organization, strategy, and social appeal

In overall analysis the legitimacy–election Cycle, there is a deep interconnection between the crisis of legitimacy and electoral decline. When legitimacy weakens, public trust declines, leading to electoral defeat; and electoral defeat further erodes legitimacy. From a Marxist perspective, this condition can be interpreted as a result of revisionism and the erosion of class-based foundations.

Conclusion: The contemporary crisis of Nepalese communist parties reflects a profound divergence between ideological commitments and practical governance. Historically, Nepalese communists emerged as revolutionary forces advocating the eradication of feudal exploitation, foreign domination, and class oppression (Communist Party of Nepal, 1949). Their long struggle, encompassing the Jhapa rebellion, the 1990 People’s Movement, the Maoist insurgency, and the 2006–2007 People’s Movement, positioned them as significant actors in shaping Nepal’s political landscape. However, despite occupying central and local governmental positions, these parties have largely failed to implement policies that substantively address unemployment, inequality, or the aspirations of the youth. Consequently, public trust in communist parties has eroded, particularly among the new generation, who increasingly perceive their promises of liberation and equality as rhetorical rather than practical.

The ideological core of this crisis stems from the abandonment of class struggle and the shift toward class collaboration. According to Marxist theory, history is fundamentally the history of class struggles, and meaningful social transformation occurs through the confrontation of exploitative relations rather than compromise ([34]; Lenin, 1917/1964). Yet, Nepalese communist parties—particularly CPN (UML) and CPN (Maoist Centre)—have gradually embraced parliamentary democracy, electoral competition, and governance within existing state structures. While this strategic shift has allowed them to access state power, it has simultaneously diluted revolutionary objectives, encouraged reformist tendencies, and led to the “bourgeoisification” of party structures and practices. Even parties that rhetorically emphasize armed struggle or revolutionary change, such as CPN (Mashal), have struggled to provide effective alternatives, resulting in practical alignment with parliamentary norms.

Multiple factors have reinforced this deviation. Ideological ambiguity, stemming from inadequate theoretical grounding and leadership-driven interpretations of Marxism, has contributed to reformist drift ([34]; [30]). The global weakening of socialist movements following the Soviet Union’s dissolution, the multi-dimensional nature of Nepalese class structures shaped by caste, ethnicity, and regional disparities, and the prioritization of state power over revolutionary transformation have further entrenched this crisis. Moreover, the adoption of neoliberal economic policies by UML and Maoist-led governments—through privatization, liberalization, and market-oriented reforms—has intensified the gap between ideological rhetoric and practical governance, undermining the credibility of these parties in the eyes of citizens, particularly the youth.

The cumulative effect of these dynamics is a profound ideological and organizational crisis. The contradiction between revolutionary ideals and reformist practices has created disillusionment, eroded legitimacy, and weakened class consciousness. The emergence of the Gen-Z movement exemplifies how a politically aware younger generation perceives this inconsistency, demanding accountability, transparency, and alignment with concrete socio-economic reforms rather than rhetorical promises. From a Marxist perspective, this development signals the dangers of abandoning class struggle for class collaboration, as it stabilizes rather than challenges structural exploitation, limiting the transformative potential of communist movements.

In conclusion, the crisis facing Nepalese communists is not merely political but fundamentally ideological and organizational. The abandonment of core revolutionary principles, coupled with adaptation to bourgeois state structures and neoliberal economic practices, has undermined both popular support and the transformative mission of these parties. Addressing this crisis requires a return to rigorous ideological grounding, a clear alignment of theory and practice, and strategies that genuinely confront structural inequality rather than accommodate it, thereby restoring both legitimacy and revolutionary potential within Nepalese communism.

From the issues presented above, it is evident that the various phases of the declining condition of Nepalese communists can be clearly identified. The stated facts indicate that the communist parties themselves have gradually moved in a downward trajectory. Even when major parties such as the UML and the Maoists were in positions of government and state power, they failed to implement even basic reform measures. Although their official documents contained appealing and progressive commitments, the communist parties that secured majorities through electoral processes were unable to bring significant improvements in employment generation, industrial development, agriculture, free education, and healthcare. They failed to prevent the large-scale outmigration of youth labor. There are hardly any convincing examples of the establishment of industries and factories under their leadership. In sectors such as education and health, vested interests and mafias continued to exploit the system extensively. As a result, ordinary people became increasingly marginalized and oppressed across multiple sectors. The continuous outflow of youth labor abroad contributed to the abandonment of agricultural land, turning it increasingly barren. Despite being in power, the communist parties failed to demonstrate any reforms that were fundamentally different from those of capitalist democracies. On the contrary, they became increasingly entangled in corruption. Their proclaimed ideals of justice and liberation gradually appeared superficial and rhetorical, leading to the erosion of public trust and confidence. On the other hand, the Communist Party of Nepal (Mashal), which emphasized legal and peaceful struggles as a tactical approach for revolutionary preparation, was unable to effectively establish its agenda among the masses. Even in local governments where it had electoral success and administrative authority, it failed to present any distinct or innovative model of governance. Similarly, the influence of the Nepal Workers and Peasants Party has remained limited. Other smaller communist groups outside parliament have also failed to introduce programs capable of attracting broad public support.

An unpublished study highlights the crisis of governance and declining trust in political institutions. Based on personal communication (October 10, 2025), the study repeatedly identifies corruption, nepotism, and patronage networks as persistent features of Nepal’s political system. According to the participants, political parties exercise disproportionate influence over state institutions, which weakens accountability mechanisms and limits transparency in governance. Most respondents indicated that the political system is increasingly dominated by party interests rather than public welfare. This perception has generated significant frustration among young citizens, who feel that the political elite have failed to address pressing social and economic issues. Referring to personal communications (December 10 and 12, 2025), respondents used the term “partycracy,” in contrast to meritocracy, to describe a political environment in which party control over institutions restricts democratic accountability and marginalizes citizen participation [51]. The functioning of Nepalese communists clearly demonstrates that they failed to distinguish themselves. Thus, the inability of Nepalese communist parties to effectively utilize the support of the people has led to the emergence of a downward crisis in their political and ideological trajectory. The following table helps to further clarify their condition.

4.3 New crisises after Gen-Z movementm, 2025

Contemporary Youth and Digital Media: In the contemporary global order, digital media has exerted a profound influence on the consciousness, behavior, and political participation of youth. From a Marxist perspective, digital media is not merely a neutral means of communication but an ideological structure operating within capitalist relations of production. As Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels argue, the economic base determines the ideological superstructure; in today’s context, digital platforms are controlled by large technology corporations, which shape youth consciousness toward consumerism, individualism, and immediate gratification. In this way, digital media obscures class realities and contributes to the construction of “false consciousness” ([35]; [23]). On the other hand, digital media is not only an instrument of domination but also a potential site of resistance. Antonio Gramsci’s concept of “hegemony” demonstrates how the ruling class maintains dominance through cultural and ideological control. Today, platforms such as Facebook and Twitter enable youth to express alternative ideas, mobilize movements, and articulate resistance. However, since these platforms are embedded within capitalist market structures, they transform users’ data, attention, and behavior into commodities. Thus, even resistance risks being absorbed into the capitalist framework, potentially weakening genuine class struggle ([20]; [23]). In this context, the role of youth must be understood dialectically. On the one hand, they are consumers within digital capitalism; on the other, they represent a potential transformative force. If youth can critically understand the structural dimensions of digital media—such as ownership, control, and profit orientation—they can emerge as conscious political actors. Otherwise, their engagement remains limited to “clicktivism” or superficial participation. Therefore, the use of digital media must be critically linked with class consciousness, as only such an approach can enable genuine social transformation ([34]; [20]).

Impact of Digital Media: A study shows that adolescents’ digital media use is highly context-dependent, meaning its effects are not consistently positive or negative. Using an experience sampling method, the authors find that the impact of digital media on learning and academic performance depends mainly on when, how, and in what situation it is used. Overall, the study concludes that digital media effects are complex and vary according to students’ daily experiences, time management, and activity contexts[37]. In the contemporary context, it is not ideas themselves but repeatedly appearing content on digital screens that has a profound influence on the psychology of youth. The primary conceptual basis of such influence lies in the repeated exposure effect, also known as the mere exposure effect, which suggests that repeated exposure to a stimulus increases an individual’s attraction toward and acceptance of it. In digital environments, this effect becomes particularly powerful, as initial exposure can even override prior beliefs, and through continuous repetition, these effects may become stabilized and long-lasting. Empirical studies indicate that repeated exposure stabilizes media effects, making them enduring over time (as suggested in the Sehata et al. model). The cognitive consequences are significant, particularly in terms of attention, memory, and overall mental processing. Short-form videos and continuous scrolling weaken attention span, while constant context switching leads to cognitive overload. Furthermore, short-form content reduces the capacity for deep memory retention ([10]; [43]). Research also highlights neurological impacts, showing that extensive digital media use can lead to structural changes in the brain, particularly in areas such as the cortex and cerebellum [48]. From a psychological perspective, studies have examined mental health, long-term effects, and overall well-being. Youth who engage heavily with digital media are more likely to experience lower well-being [52], and long-term high usage is associated with increased mental health problems [11]. These findings suggest that digital media has significant consequences for overall human health, including heightened social comparison, anxiety, and issues related to self-image [58]. Moreover, the influence of algorithmic repetition is extensive. Algorithm-driven repetition continuously bombards users with information, shaping identity formation through social comparison and peer pressure [2]. At the same time, the process of habituation leads to reduced responsiveness as repeated exposure diminishes sensitivity to stimuli [25]. Digital media also affects education and behavior: while it reduces study time, it does not always directly lower academic performance ((Mayen et al., 2025). A synthesis of these studies reveals several key effects of digital media: attention fragmentation, memory weakening, emotional instability, identity construction through repetition, habituation and desensitization, and algorithmic behavioral conditioning. While all of these have negative implications, research suggests that the combination of repetition, algorithmic influence, and short-form content is particularly harmful. These effects are widespread among Nepalese youth. Rather than engaging with the long and complex narratives of communist theory, they are more attracted to short captions and simplified content on digital platforms. As a result, the transmission of communist ideological frameworks is increasingly weakening. The following references further illustrate this phenomenon.

Class Politics and Identity/Digital Politics: According to Marxist theory, the fundamental premise is that the entire history of human society is the history of class struggle [34]. From this perspective, as long as society remains structured around class divisions, social contradictions and class struggle will persist. Traditionally, communist politics has developed on the basis of this framework of class struggle. However, in the contemporary context—particularly when examining the political engagement of Generation Z—this trend appears to be gradually shifting. Current youth movements are increasingly influenced by identity-based politics, issue-based mobilization, and digital forms of activism ([24]; Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). As a result, rather than seeking structural explanations for social inequality, there is a growing tendency to focus on immediate, issue-specific concerns. Consequently, class-based analysis among the new generation has weakened. This emerging indifference or neglect toward class analysis has contributed to the perception of communist ideology as “outdated” among youth.

Crisis of Hegemony: According to Antonio [20], power is sustained not merely through the state but through consent. The crisis faced by communists can be significantly attributed to a crisis of hegemony. Communist parties have been gradually losing their moral and intellectual leadership, and the younger generation increasingly perceives them as forces of the status quo. As a result, there has been a decline in ideological leadership, leading to a collapse of hegemony.

Decline of Grand Narratives: As argued by Jean-François [32], grand narratives lose their credibility in the postmodern era. The contemporary crisis of communist ideology is closely linked to the declining trust of the new generation in such grand narratives. Youth are increasingly disengaged from overarching ideals such as revolution and socialism, instead focusing on immediate and issue-based concerns. Consequently, the ideological legacy of communism has weakened. In Nepal, the fact that people are not paying attention to long-standing, corruption-free, committed communist parties like the Rashtriya Janamorcha, but are instead seeking new sources of power, can be seen as a sign of the decline of the grand narrative. Even though there is no clear information about the future of these new forces, the very fact that people are gravitating toward them indicates the weakening of the grand narrative. In this way, the younger generation is not only reacting to issues of corruption they have observed, but they are also producing such outcomes through the pathways of social media.

Power–Knowledge Crisis: According to Michel [18], knowledge and power are intrinsically interconnected; power produces and regulates what is accepted as knowledge, and knowledge, in turn, reinforces power relations. In the context of digital and social media, new forms of knowledge production and dissemination have emerged that challenge traditional party discourse and institutional authority. These media platforms shape how information is produced, circulated, and consumed, often bypassing established political narratives and expertise [8]. As a result, foundational truthclaims associated with communist ideology—such as the ultimate victory of the people, equality, justice, and liberation—face increasing challenge and contestation in public forums, weakening the control that traditional parties once exercised over dominant narratives. Grand narratives, which analyze subjects by tracing their historical roots and legitimacy claims, are being disrupted by fragmented, shortform, and affectdriven content on platforms like TikTok and Instagram. Nepali communist parties, like many traditional political actors globally, have struggled to adapt to these emerging forms of knowledge production and narrative competition, contributing to a power–knowledge crisis within their own discourse and public engagement strategies (van Dijck, Poell, & de Waal, 2018).

Organizational Crisis: The ideological crisis of the organizational model has become a major factor contributing to the decline of Nepalese communist parties. Traditionally, communist organizations are hierarchical and centralized, based on the principle of democratic centralism. Lenin argues that democratic centralism ensures unity of action through centralized leadership combined with internal democracy (Lenin, 1902/1973). However, the 2025 Gen-Z movement has been characterized by decentralized, leaderless, and network-based structures. Manuel [8] argues that contemporary social movements increasingly operate through horizontal, networked forms rather than rigid hierarchical organizations. The success of such models raises serious questions about the continued relevance of traditional organizational philosophy and challenges the very foundation of democratic centralism.One of the central problems facing Nepalese communist parties is their failure to resonate with the younger generation. Due to outdated political language, rigid ideological frameworks, and a weak presence in digital spaces, these parties have been unable to effectively engage youth. Zeynep [62] explains that digitally networked movements empower individuals to mobilize without relying on formal organizational structures, making traditional party systems less appealing to younger generations. As a result, youth are increasingly distancing themselves from communism, deepening the organizational crisis.

Although the Nepal Communist Party (Mashal) has attempted to implement Leninist organizational principles, it has failed to build a strong mass base on that foundation. In contrast, parties such as UML and Maoists have largely abandoned the Leninist organizational model. As a result, their organizations have grown quantitatively but resemble amorphous masses lacking essential communist characteristics. In this regard, Robert Michels (1911/1962), in his “iron law of oligarchy,” argues that large-scale organizations tend to become bureaucratic and detached from their original ideological commitments. Such organizations are not only incapable of advancing communist politics but also lack the moral capacity to resist adverse political upheavals. The challenges faced by UML and Maoist parties after the Gen-Z movement clearly reflect this structural and ideological weakness.

Although communist movements have historically been rooted in youth mobilization, recent trends indicate a growing disengagement of youth from communist parties. This issue has often been overlooked by many communist groups. However, the Communist Party of Nepal (Mashal), in its Ninth General Convention, explicitly acknowledged its inability to attract the new generation, highlighting weaknesses such as the lack of an enabling environment, insufficient intellectual development of youth, and failure to implement effective organizational strategies (CPN [Mashal], 2081).

Moreover, contemporary Nepali youth are more influenced by globalization, digital culture, and liberal democratic values, which has reduced their attraction toward traditional class-based political narratives. Internal issues such as unequal distribution of opportunities, dominance of aging leadership, and lack of innovation have further discouraged youth participation. Youth and student organizations have largely remained extensions of parent parties rather than independent ideological platforms, limiting critical thinking and creativity. Consequently, youth are increasingly drawn toward alternative political movements, civil society, or non-political spheres. From a Marxist perspective, this situation can be understood as a crisis in the reproduction of class consciousness, as the failure to transmit class consciousness weakens organizational continuity [20].

Post-Marxist Challenges: Post-Marxist developments have posed additional challenges to traditional communist politics. Contemporary political movements increasingly emphasize identity, environment, and rights-based issues, which classical Marxism does not fully address. This has created a need for reinterpretation and adaptation of Marxist theory in the modern context. The post-Marxist current challenges the traditional Marxist class-centered analysis, emphasizing the understanding of society as a structure of multiple forms of power, identities, and discourses. In this context, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe critique the notion of class as the sole historical agent, highlighting the role of “hegemonic articulation” and “discourse” [27]. However, scholars such as Ellen Meiksins Wood and Alex Callinicos have criticized this approach, arguing that post-Marxism risks weakening the centrality of class struggle and overlooking the material foundations of capitalist structures ([66]; [7]). In the Nepali context, such a pluralistic and identity-based perspective appears to intensify ideological ambiguity within the communist movement, create conflicts between class agendas and identity politics, and exacerbate organizational instability, ultimately increasing the likelihood of weakening the revolutionary direction.

Crisis of Representation: The crisis of representation has become a significant challenge for contemporary Nepali communist movements. Traditionally, communist parties have presented themselves as “representatives of the people.” However, recent political developments, particularly the Gen-Z movement, have revealed that youth, unemployed groups, and the middle class remain inadequately represented. This has gradually widened the gap between the party and the public.

According to the political theory of representation, representation is not merely formal participation but a process through which citizens’ interests, experiences, and expectations are effectively articulated [54]. From this perspective, Nepali communist parties have failed to expand their historical class base, resulting in a noticeable “representation gap.” Furthermore, in post-industrial societies, emerging social groups—particularly youth and the educated middle class—are increasingly disengaged from traditional class-based politics, as Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris (2017) have noted. They argue that the new generation is drawn toward identity-based and issue-based politics, which challenges class-centered forms of representation.

In the Nepali context, this trend is evident. As demonstrated by the Gen-Z movement, youth expressed their dissatisfaction through leaderless, digital, and issue-focused activism, but established communist parties were unable to institutionalize or channel this engagement effectively. Additionally, unequal access to opportunities within the party, dominance of the old leadership, and insufficient inclusion of youth in decision-making processes have further exacerbated the representation crisis. According to Pierre [6], unequal distribution of power and opportunity generates “symbolic exclusion” among social groups, weakening institutional representation.

As a result, the youth’s interest in communist ideology has declined, and traditional values increasingly appear outdated. Overall, the crisis of representation manifests in two key ways: increasing distance between the party and the public, and disengagement of the younger generation. To address this challenge, communist parties must ensure that youth are not merely “agents of change” but equal participants in decision-making, embrace digital and issue-based politics, and restructure organizational frameworks to be inclusive and accountable.

Contradiction between Practice and Theory: The contradiction between practice and theory has become a defining challenge for Nepali politics. Over the past 36 years, both the Congress and communist parties have alternated in holding power. During this period, the younger generation has increasingly identified corruption, nepotism, and patronage networks as permanent features of Nepal’s political system. Political parties have maintained disproportionate control over state institutions, weakening accountability mechanisms and limiting transparency in governance [51].

This study also highlights the position of Nepali communist parties. Despite coming to power, they have failed to resolve the tension between their ideology and practical governance. While their theoretical principles advocate equality and anti-corruption, in practice they have often adopted behaviors characteristic of power politics, including corruption, nepotism, and patronage. The Gen-Z movement has exposed this contradiction, leading to a collapse in the ideological credibility of these parties. Moreover, even while in power, Nepali communists appear to be influenced by capitalist forces.

Historically, similar contradictions are observable in global communist movements. When Nikita Khrushchev came to power in the Soviet Union, he implemented several policy changes during the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956. Khrushchev openly criticized Stalin, launched campaigns against the cult of personality, and weakened Stalin’s image as an infallible leader [14]. He also promoted a policy of peaceful coexistence, arguing that direct conflict between socialist and capitalist systems was not necessary. This established the concept of advancing competition through peaceful means (Mayer, 2006; [14]). Khrushchev’s secret speech marked a major ideological shift in the Soviet Union [14]. Khrushchev further argued that cooperation and coexistence with capitalist countries were possible (Evans, n.d.).

These developments illustrate how such policies created a theoretical contradiction within communist ideology, which traditionally emphasized armed class struggle at the international level. Instead, the emphasis shifted toward class coordination and compromise. The institutional interpretation of Marxism, which had historically prioritized class struggle, was deliberately set aside, generating a theoretical crisis. Consequently, it was unsurprising that communist practice increasingly reflected capitalist influences. During this period, the global system was divided into socialist and capitalist poles. For any party to deviate from its theoretical tenets was essentially to acknowledge or imitate the influence of the other pole. By publicly opposing Stalin while tacitly accepting capitalist critiques, Khrushchev implemented reforms that failed to fully realize communist principles, while the framework for collective governance also deteriorated. This historical example illustrates a significant portion of the ideological deviations that Nepali communists have experienced.

Overall Crisis a in the aftermath of the Gen-Z movement, Nepalese communists face multiple interconnected crises, including: 1. limitations of class analysis 2. loss of ideological leadership 3, collapse of grand narratives 4. digital knowledge challenges 5. crisis of representation 6. organizational rigidity 7. contradiction between theory and practice 8. growing youth disconnection . While communist parties remain rooted in structure-based politics, the Gen-Z movement represents fluid, networked, and identity-based politics. This contrast highlights the urgent need for either a serious ideological transformation or a more effective implementation of core communist values.

Digital Media, Politics, and Capitalism: Digital Media, Politics, and Capitalism: In the contemporary era, politics is increasingly conducted through digital platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. From a Marxist perspective, these platforms are not neutral but are embedded within profit-driven capitalist structures. As Karl Marx argues, capitalist systems tend to commodify all aspects of social life, including ideas and communication (Marx, 1867/1976).

1. Algorithmic Control: Algorithms regulate attention and the flow of information. Shoshana [68] explains that digital platforms operate through “surveillance capitalism,” where user behavior is monitored and shaped for profit maximization.

2. Political Marketization: Politics increasingly resembles a marketplace where ideas compete for visibility and engagement. Jodi [12] argues that communicative capitalism transforms political discourse into market-driven exchanges, prioritizing circulation over substantive engagement.

3. Commodification of Ideas: Ideas are reduced to content; movements become trends; and leaders are turned into brands. This promotes superficial popularity over deep ideological debate—representing a new form of commodity fetishism (Marx, 1867/1976).

4. Negative Impact on Class Consciousness: Digital media places individuals in “echo chambers,” fragmenting collective experience and weakening class unity. Eli [53] describes how filter bubbles isolate users, limiting exposure to diverse perspectives and undermining collective political awareness.

5. Limits of Digital Activism: Digital movements spread rapidly but often fail to build long-term organization. Evgeny [41] criticizes “clicktivism,” arguing that low-cost digital participation creates an illusion of activism without producing structural transformation. Similarly, Zeynep [62] notes that networked protests are powerful but often lack the organizational depth required for sustained political change.

6. Media Effects, Habitual Exposure, and Long-Term Stabilization of Digital Influence: After repeated use of social media, its effects gradually diminish or stabilize. Therefore, in the long term, no strong or significant media effects are observed. This is why many studies conclude that “media effects are weak” [3].

Leaderless Movements and Organizational Crisis:Modern movements are often decentralized, spontaneous, and leaderless. However, Marxist theory emphasizes the importance of organization, leadership, and the party. Vladimir Lenin highlighted the necessity of a vanguard party for revolutionary change (Lenin, 1902/1969). At the same time, Rosa Luxemburg recognized the importance of spontaneity in mass movements but argued that it must be combined with conscious organization (Luxemburg, 1906/2008).

Leaderless movements face several limitations:

1. Lack of clear direction (Lenin, 1902/1969)

2. Weak long-term strategy (Manuel Castells, 2012)

3. Disorganized decision-making processes (Lenin, 1902/1969)

4. Vulnerability to control by state or capitalist forces (Zeynep Tufekci, 2017)

5. Short lifespan (rapid rise and rapid decline) ([62]; [8])

While spontaneous movements are important from a Marxist perspective, they are not sufficient (Luxemburg, 1906/2008). Long-term transformation requires conscious organization (Lenin, 1902/1969). Even in leaderless movements, informal power structures tend to emerge, reducing transparency and accountability, as Jo Freeman argues in her concept of the “tyranny of structurelessness” [19].

Both digital media politics and leaderless movements pose significant challenges to traditional Marxist organization. However, they are not entirely negative. They also contain new possibilities, such as new forms of political participation, alternative modes of expression, and rapid mobilization ([8]; [62]). The key question, therefore, is: how can these new forms be utilized in favor of class struggle? Drawing on Antonio Gramsci, this can be understood as a struggle for counter-hegemony within new digital and social spaces [20].

From a Marxist perspective, digital media transforms ideas into commodities and weakens class consciousness (Karl Marx, 1867/1976). Leaderless movements undermine organizational clarity and long-term goals (Lenin, 1902/1969; [19]).

As potential solutions:

1. Digital platforms can be used as tools for building counter-hegemony [20]

2. Spontaneous movements can be transformed into organized movements (Luxemburg, 1906/2008; Lenin, 1902/1969)

3. A balance can be maintained between leadership and mass participation (Lenin, 1902/1969)

Through these approaches, the deep crisis can be mitigated and redirected toward transformative political possibilities.

conclusion: The emergence of the Gen-Z political movement in Nepal has exposed a multi-dimensional crisis within Nepalese communist parties, highlighting both structural and ideological deficiencies. Analysis of youth engagement demonstrates that contemporary digital media has profoundly reshaped political consciousness, behavior, and mobilization. Digital platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and TikTok act as double-edged tools: they provide spaces for alternative ideas, mobilization, and resistance, yet they are embedded in capitalist market structures that commodify attention, behavior, and ideas. The repetitive exposure effect, algorithmic conditioning, and short-form content have fragmented attention spans, weakened memory retention, and fostered emotional instability among youth. Consequently, traditional forms of ideological transmission, such as class-based communist theory, struggle to reach a generation increasingly oriented toward immediate, identity-based, and issue-specific concerns.

From a Marxist perspective, this development underscores the weakening of class consciousness. Digital media, while offering potential for political engagement, risks producing “clicktivism” and superficial participation if structural and ideological dimensions are ignored. The Gen-Z movement, characterized by decentralized, leaderless, and network-based activism, further challenges hierarchical and centralized communist organizational models based on democratic centralism. This dissonance between organizational rigidity and fluid youth-led activism has resulted in significant questions regarding the relevance of traditional party structures. Moreover, the inability of communist parties to connect with youth—through outdated language, rigid ideological frameworks, and limited digital presence—has created a widening generational and organizational gap, contributing to the erosion of moral and intellectual leadership.

The crisis extends to ideological and theoretical domains. Nepali communist parties face a collapse of grand narratives, a loss of ideological leadership, and contradictions between theoretical principles and practical governance. Historical promises of equality, justice, and liberation are increasingly viewed as rhetorical, particularly as parties in power have often mirrored the very systems they critique, adopting corrupt practices and succumbing to patronage networks. Additionally, the rise of post-Marxist, identity-focused, and issue-based political movements has further weakened class-centered representation and highlighted the failure of traditional communist structures to adapt to contemporary socio-political realities. As a result, youth increasingly perceive established communist parties as forces of the status quo rather than transformative actors.

Despite these challenges, opportunities exist for transformation. Digital platforms, when strategically leveraged, can serve as tools to build counter-hegemony, promote alternative narratives, and facilitate organized mass participation. Spontaneous or leaderless movements can be channeled into structured activism that balances leadership and grassroots involvement. The Marxist framework emphasizes the importance of conscious organization, ideological clarity, and class-conscious mobilization; integrating these principles into modern digital and decentralized forms of activism may allow communist parties to regain relevance and influence.

In sum, the Gen-Z movement has exposed a profound crisis in Nepali communism—spanning organizational, ideological, generational, and representational dimensions. The erosion of class consciousness, coupled with digital transformation and youth disengagement, represents both a challenge and an opportunity. By critically engaging with digital media, adapting organizational models, and bridging the generational divide, Nepalese communists have the potential to mitigate this crisis, revitalize ideological transmission, and foster a transformative political trajectory aligned with both historical principles and contemporary realities. The success of this effort depends on their ability to reinterpret Marxist theory in light of postmodern digital realities and to reconnect meaningfully with the emerging political consciousness of Nepal’s youth.

The above discussion clearly illustrates the widening gap between Nepalese communists and the psychology of the new generation. It appears impossible to advance the current political agenda without taking digital media into account. The proper use of digital media is beneficial and valuable for all of humanity. However, various studies have highlighted its misuse, which has resulted in a lack of deep engagement and critical study among the youth. The new generation’s apparent indifference toward the theoretical concepts of class struggle, which once carried great significance, poses a serious challenge for Nepalese communists, as it could either reshape their future or push them toward obsolescence. Research presented in the literature review underscores the influence of digital media, the psychology of Nepalese youth, and the current conditions of communist parties. To better understand the crises confronting Nepalese communists in relation to these factors, the table below provides additional support.

4.4 Findings

This study finds that Nepali communist parties are currently experiencing a deep and multidimensional crisis that is both ideological and organizational in nature, particularly intensified after the 2025 Gen-Z movement. At the ideological level, the research reveals a significant deviation from classical Marxist principles of class struggle toward reformist tendencies and class collaboration. Programs such as People’s Multiparty Democracy and 21st Century People’s Democracy have effectively institutionalized parliamentary politics as an end rather than a means, weakening revolutionary orientation. This has produced a clear contradiction between theory and practice, eroding ideological credibility among the public, especially youth.

Organizationally, communist parties remain trapped in rigid, hierarchical structures based on democratic centralism, which contrasts sharply with the decentralized, network-based, and leaderless nature of the Gen-Z movement. This mismatch has created a serious disconnection between parties and the younger generation. The study finds that youth increasingly perceive communist parties as outdated, bureaucratic, and unresponsive to contemporary realities.

A key finding is the transformative role of digital media. Algorithm-driven content, repeated exposure, and short-form communication have reshaped cognitive patterns, reducing attention span and weakening engagement with complex ideological texts. As a result, traditional forms of political education and propaganda have lost effectiveness. Digital media has also facilitated identity-based and issue-based politics, displacing class-based analysis and contributing to the decline of class consciousness.

The study further identifies a crisis of hegemony, where communist parties have lost their moral and intellectual leadership, as well as a crisis of representation, particularly among youth and emerging social groups. This has directly contributed to declining electoral performance and weakening legitimacy.

Overall, the findings suggest that the crisis is structural and systemic, rooted in ideological deviation, organizational rigidity, digital transformation, and generational change. Without profound ideological renewal, organizational restructuring, and effective engagement with digital political realities, the future relevance of Nepali communist parties remains uncertain.

4.5 Conclusion

The study concludes that Nepal’s communist parties are currently facing a profound ideological and organizational crisis, intensified by the post-2025 Gen-Z movement and the rapid expansion of digital media. Historically, Nepalese communists derived their strength from class-based politics, revolutionary ideology, and their close connection with workers and peasants. However, over time, a significant shift from class struggle toward class collaboration, parliamentary reformism, and power-centered politics has weakened their ideological clarity and revolutionary character. This has created a widening gap between theory and practice, resulting in declining public trust and legitimacy.

The rise of the Gen-Z movement represents a structural transformation in political participation. Unlike traditional party-led mobilization, this movement is decentralized, digitally organized, and issue-based. It reflects a new political consciousness shaped by algorithm-driven digital media, short-form content, and identity-based politics. As a result, traditional Marxist narratives centered on class struggle are increasingly perceived as outdated or irrelevant by the younger generation. The inability of communist parties to adapt to these changing cognitive and communicative environments has deepened their disconnection from youth.

At the organizational level, rigid hierarchical structures based on democratic centralism have proven ineffective in responding to network-based, leaderless movements. Simultaneously, internal problems such as leadership stagnation, lack of internal democracy, and unequal opportunities have further weakened party structures. The crisis of hegemony, as conceptualized by Antonio Gramsci, is clearly visible, as communist parties have lost their moral and intellectual leadership in society.

In conclusion, the crisis is multidimensional—ideological, organizational, and generational. To overcome this, Nepalese communist parties must critically reassess their theoretical frameworks, bridge the gap between ideology and practice, democratize organizational structures, and engage meaningfully with digital culture and youth consciousness. Without such transformation, their relevance in Nepal’s evolving political landscape will continue to decline.